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Surcharging the Fiduciary
FRAmN S. RowLny* AxD ROBERT A. ToEPFER**
"Surcharge" is the term broadly applied to the order or de-
cree of the court imposing liability on a fiduciary as the result of
a successful exception to his cash or property account upon his
intermediate or final accounting. In this paper consideration will
be limited to the liability of the fiduciary for breaches of duty with
respect to investments, and special emphasis will be placed on cer-
tain unusual factors which may affect that liability.
The claims of the beneficiary against the trustee may arise
from a great variety of circumstances.' For example, the trustee
may have breached his duty to invest trust funds by unreasonable
delay or by not investing at all. He may have made an improper
or illegal investment which he later sold at a profit or at a loss
or retained until the accounting. He may have received an invest-
ment which was improper for him as a fiduciary when he received
it or which subsequently became improper due either to changes
in the law governing investments or to changes in the quality of
the investment. In either event he may have delayed converting
the investment into a proper security for more than a reasonable
time or until a bad market condition prevailed or he may never
have converted it. He may have invested all or an overly large
proportion of the funds of the trust in a single security in viola-
tion of his duty reasonably to diversify the investment portfolio.
In many of these situations further variety may be provided by the
fact that the trustee acted honestly and in good faith or in bad
faith or in the advancement of his own self interest. Then, too, the
provisions of the trust instrument may have directed or permitted
him to do as he did or to do something quite different.
While the various combinations of ingredients which make up
the beneficiary's claim pose a series of problems, the general prin-
ciple governing surcharge for breach of an investment duty is not
difficult to state. That which the trustee loses by such breach he
loses for himself; that which he gains he gains for the trust. This
generality is usually described as giving the beneficiary alterna-
tive remedies against the trustee to force him to make good any
loss, or to yield any gain or to compel him to put the trust in as
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good a profit position as if no breach had occurred.2 While these
alternatives are not confined to breaches of investment duties they
find their most frequent application in the investment situation.
It follows that if the trustee has delayed unreasonably in invest-
ing or has not invested at all, he is surchargeable with "interest"
representing the approximate average yield from approved securi-
ties during the period of the breach as determined by the court 3
In the event that he violated his duty to purchase certain specific
securities he may be surcharged -with the return which was paid
to holders of those securities during his breach,4 together with any
appreciation in the value of the securities up to the time of the de-
cree.5 If he invests in a non-legal which turns out fortunately, the
beneficiaries may affirm the purchase and require the trustee to ac-
count for the investment and the profit therefrom; 6 but if the non-
legal investment turns out badly, the trustee may be compelled to
refund the purchase price, plus interest, to the trust, thus in effect
buying the investment for himself. 7 In such a case the court has
wide discretion in deciding whether the interest shall be an ap-
proximation of the yield from authorized investments or the legal
2 See RESTATEymEN, TRUSTS § 205 (1935); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§
703 et seq. (1946); ScoTr, TRusTS §§ 205 et seq. (1939). The additional alter-
natives of specific enforcement and specific reparation are not considered to
be applicable here. See ScoTT, TRUSTS § 208 (1939); BOrERT, TRUSTS A w TAUs-
§ 703 (1946).
3 Board of Regents v. Wilson, 73 Colo. 1, 213 Pac. 131 (1923); Collins v.
Collins, 168 Ore. 666, 126 P. 2d 512 (1942); In re Ayvazian's Estate, 153 Misc.
467, 275 N.Y. Supp. 123 (1934). In the New York case, for twelve years trustees
had on hand, uninvested, about $3700. In surcharging them the court said
(p. 136):
"Their obligation in this connection is to place the cestuis que
trustent in the same position which they would have been had their
acts conformed to their urimary obligations of diligence and prudence.
If this sum had been placed in United States Liberty bonds or even
in a savings bank, it would have yielded at least 4% per annum com-
pounded semi-annually. This is the amount by which the trust
beneficiaries have suffered by reason of the dereliction of the trustees
and, consequently, is the measure of their damage in this connection."4 
n re Nola's Estate, 333 Pa. 106, 3 A. 2d 326 (1939); In re Listman's
Estate, 57 Utah 471, 197 Pac. 596 (1921); Church v. Church, 112 Me. 459, 120
Atl. 428 (1923).
5 See BOGERT, TRusTS AnD TRusTEEs §§ 707-8 (1946); ScOTT, TRUSTS § 211
(1939).
6 Pennsylvania Co. Etc. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 59 A. 2d 24, 37 (1948);
Russell's Extrs. v. Passmore, 127 Va. 475, 103 S.E. 652, 662 (1920); City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Evans, 255 App. Div. 135, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 406 (1938). See also
Eisenlohr's Estate, 258 Pa. 431, 102 Atl. 115 (1917); In re Gurkin's Will, 142
Misc. 271, 254 N. Y. Supp. 494 (1931).
7 In re Jones Estate, 163 Pa. Super. 129, 60 A. 2d 366 (1948); In 'e Fouk's
Estate, 213 Wis. 550, 252 N.W. 160 (1934); In re Sanders Estate, 304 II. App.
57, 25 N.E. 2d 923 (1940); Kinney v. Uglow, 163 Ore. 539, 98 P. 2d 1006 (1940).
The trustee will of course be credited with the income, if any, received by the
trust from the non-legal.
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rate or some other rate.s Frequently the determining factor has
been the trustee's good or bad faith in making the unauthorized
investment.9
For breach of a duty to convert, the surcharge will be the dif-
ference between the value of the security at the time the court
determines the fiduciary should have sold and its value when he
did sell.10 If he retains the investment until the accounting, he
may be charged with the value when he should have sold, thus
forcing the trustee to purchase for himself,11 or the court may or-
der the investment sold and the difference charged to the trustee.12
Since normally the non-converting fiduciary is under twin duties
to sell and to reinvest the proceeds, there should be added to the
surcharge a sum approximating the income he would have received
if he had carried out both duties.13 If his breach consists of a failure
to diversify investments, the court may, and should, determine the
maximum which could reasonably have been invested in the se-
curity in question and surcharge the trustee for loss occasioned by
investment in excess of that amount.14
8 Albright v. Jefferson County Natl. Bank, 292 N.Y. 31, 53 N.E. 2d 753
(1944) ("rate of interest commensurate with average earnings of trust funds");
Miller v. Pender, 93 N.H. 1, 34 A. 2d 663 (1943) (3-%% held "equitable in
view of present low interest rates"); Sellers v. Milford, 101 Ind. App. 590, 198
N.E. 456 (1935) (6% allowed as "reasonable income").
been the trustee's good or bad faith in making the unauthorized
9Pennsylvania Co., Etc. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 59 A. 2d 24, 37-8
(1948); St. Germain v. Tuttle, 114 Vt. 263, 44 A. 2d 137 (1945). The Vermont
court said, citing RESTATELIENT, TRusTs § 207, comment a (1935):
"Ordinarily if a breach of trust consists in an improper purchase of
property for the trust, the trustee is chargeable with interest at the
current rate of return on trust investments, unless the breach of trust
was intentionally committed, in which case he is ordinarily charge-
able with interest at the legal rate. The real question is what the
equities of the particular case demand."
See also Scott § 207.1 (1939).
10 Babbitt v. Fidelity Trust Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 745, 66 AtI. 1076 (1907); In re
Baker, 249 App. Div. 265, 292 N.Y. Supp. 122 (1936); Paul v. Girard Trust
Co., 124 F. 2d 809 (7th Cir. 1941); Mcnnes v. Whitman, 313 Mass. 19, 46 N.E.
2d 527 (1943).
11In re See's Estate, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 47 (N.Y. Surr. 1942); In re Lewis' Estate,
344 Pa. 586, 26 A. 2d 445 (1942); In re Blish Trust, 350 Pa. 311, 38 A. 2d 9, 12
(1944); Cameron Trust Co. v. Leibrandt, 229 Mo. App. 450, 83 S.W. 2d 234
(1935).
12 Pollack v. Bowman, 23 N.J. Misc. 63, 41 A. 2d 253 (1945).
13 Paul v. Girard Trust Co., 124 F. 2d 809 (7th Cir. 1941); In re North's
Will, 235 Wis. 639, 294 N.W. 15, 17 (1940). See also Dickerson v. Camden Trust
Co., 1 N.J. 459, 64 A. 2d 214, 218 (1949); In re Nola's Estate, 333 Pa. 106, 3 A.
2d 326 (1939). Again, as in the case of investment in a non-legal, the trustee
is credited with any income received by the trust from the security he im-
properly retained. In re See's Estate, supra note 12.
14 Pennsylvania Co., Etc. v. Gillmore, supra note 10 (25% of fund determin-
ed reasonable maximum; trustee surcharged with loss from excess); In re
Toel's Estate, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 896 (N.Y. Surr. 1943) (trustee, directed not to in-
vest more than $10,000 in any single investment, invested $18,000; surcharged
as to $8,000); REsTATEMsaT, TusTs § 228, comment h (1935).
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Such is a brief sketch of surcharge for breach of investment
duties in some of the more or less standard situations. It is now
proposed to examine the results of the cases where there is an ad-
ded factor present: (1) the market is distorted by panic, depres-
sion and the like; (2) the trust instrument contains an exculpatory
clause; (3) the beneficiary consents to or acquiesces in the breach;
and (4) the breaching trustee seeks to balance loss against gain.
WHmE THE Loss Is THE RESULT OF A DISTORTED MARKET
From the vantage point of 1951 it is possible to critically ap-
praise the effect of a fluctating market or a market distorted by
panic, depression and the like on the liability of a trustee for loss
in the value of trust assets. The depression of the thirties resulted
in widespread litigation in which attempts were made to surcharge
trustees for losses resulting from depressed economic conditions.
While the courts generally reached a sound result, the precise fac-
tors which control that result remain clouded. s An attempt will
be made to analyze the elements which the courts emphasized in
concluding that the trustee was either responsible or not respon-
sible.
A trustee is bound to exercise such care and diligence in per-
forming the duties of trust administration as a prudent man would
exercise in dealing with the property of others, adhering to the
rule that he is primarily a conserver. This is basically true whether
the trustee is operating in a state which has a so-called "legal list"
or not.16 The test or a variation of it is also the yard-stick by which
courts determine the liability for losses due to disrupted economic
conditions. Under such a test it is clear that the decision to sur-
charge or not will depend on the circumstances of the particular
case,17 but as will appear there are certain critical facts which in-
15 For an excellent discussion of the problems involved see Moore, A
Rationalization of Trust Surcharge Cases, 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 647 (1948); 10
ST. Jom'S L. REv. 75 (1938). While it is apparent that inflated markets may
have an equally disastrous effect on the intrinsic value of investments, the
courts have not been faced with the problem in the surcharge cases, for the
face value of the investment either remains firm or rises with the market.
Trustees, however, are faced with the problem of the proper type of invest-
ment in view of inflation, and recently this has been the subject of widespread
discussion by those in the trust field.
16 RESTATEmE1T, TRUSTS § 174 (1935); BOGERT, TRUSTS AnD TRUSTEES § 541
(1946); See Note, 77 A.L.R. 505 (1932).
17 Hatfield v. First National Bank of Danville, 317 I1 App. 169, 46 N.E. 2d
94 (1942); In re Pate's Estate, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 853 (N.Y. Surr. 1948). In the latter
case the court said, at page 858:
"The books are replete with surcharge cases, and the governing
law is as simple as it is deeply rooted. Seemingly, therefore, the solu-
tion to the problems presented should be readily at hand. Yet each
case rests on its own peculiar facts. And the elements composing
prudence are so human and imponderable, there is no scientific or
precise gauge for measuring it. Again, after the event, the line of
distinction between negligence and mere error of judgment, and be-
tween lack of care and prevision, is not always clearly discernible."
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fluence the decision.
The courts generally state that if the trustee has acted in good
faith and has not been guilty of a clear breach of trust, has acted
with ordinary prudence, and the loss is due solely to "unforeseen
and violent" curtailment of income, or depression, the trustee is
not surchargeable.' 8 Consideration of the cases demonstrates that
if on the facts the courts do not wish to surcharge, this formula is
applied. In every case where a trustee has been surcharged for loss
due to depression, he has committed a plain breach of trust as out-
lined in the introductory section of this paper.
At the outset it may be noted that the courts are hesitant to
surcharge a trustee for loss due to depression, for as courts of equity
they are impressed with the hardship of surcharging for losses
which result largely from the general disintegration of the com-
mercial community and which are fundamentally the fault of the
economic system rather than the individual. Sometimes the courts
find justification for not surcharging in the existence of an exculpa-
tory clause in the instrument,19 discretionary investment powers,20
power to retain,21 or a direction to retain or not to sell the par-
ticular investment.22 Sometimes the justification is based on ac-
quiescence or estoppel,23 or laches.24 This general reluctance to
surcharge is clearly illustrated by the tendency of the depression
lB First National Bank of Birmingham v. Basham, 238 Ala. 500, 191 So.
873 (1939); Day v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 47 Cal. App. 2d 470, 118 P.
2d 51 (1941); Cox v. Camden Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 490,
2 A. 2d 473 (1938); In re Winburn's Will, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N. Y. Supp. 758
(1931); Scorr, TRusTs § 204 (1939). It may be noted that a trustee must act in
good faith, and that this factor alone should not warrant a court in refusing
surcharge. Yet note In re McCann's Will, 212 Minn. 233, 3 N.W. 2d 226 (1942)
where trustee held stock in the same company and received no compensation,
the court appeared more lenient because of this positive proof of good faith.
19 New England Trust Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. 542, 59 N.E. 2d 263 (1945),
320 Mass. 482, 70 N.E. 2d 6 (1946); In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 270 App.
Div. 572, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 484 (1946); In re Winburn's Will, supra note 19; In re
Clark's Will, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931). For discussion see section 2
of this paper.20 In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., supra note 20. In re Beadlestone's
Estate. 146 Misc. 548, 262 N.Y. Supp. 507 (1933); In re Detre's Estate, 273 Pa.
341, 117 Atl. 54 (1922); St. Germain's Admr. v. Tuttle, supra note 10; see note,
99 A.L.R 909 (1935).21 In re Winburn's Will, supra note 19; In re Jones' Estate, 344 Pa. 100,
23 A. 2d 434 (1942); Peck v. Searle, 117 Conn. 573, 169 Ati. 602 (1933); Fair-
leigh v. Fidelity National Bank and Trust Co., 335 Mo. 360, 73 S.W. 2d 248
(1934).22 Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 70 N.E. 2d 175 (1946); cf. Estate of
Weston, 91 N.Y. 502 (1883).
23 Discussed infra in section 3 of this paper.
24 Pollack v Bowman, 139 N.J. Eq. 47, 49 A. 2d 881 (1946); ScoTT, ThusTs
§ 219 (1939).
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cases to depart from the well settled view that a trustee who takes
trust property in his individual name without ear-marking it, is re-
sponsible for any loss or decline in the value of the property, irres-
pective of the cause of loss. 25 Where the depreciation is due solely
to general economic conditions, the courts in refusing to surcharge
emphasize the good faith of the trustee and lack of causal connec-
tion between the loss and failure to ear-mark. 26 Similarly, while
a trustee may be held liable under a positive duty to diversify in-
vestments, he has been held not liable for loss resulting from a
combination of failure to diversify and a depression.27
On the other hand, the courts do not hesitate to surcharge if
the trustee's breach of trust is patent and is the direct and induc-
ing cause of a loss which might have been avoided, even though
there was a depression. Thus, in Tannenbaum v. Seacoast Trust
Co., 28 the trust company sold its bonds to investors and secured
payment of principal and interest by the deposit and pledge with
trustees of assets of the trust company. The trust instrument pro-
vided that the trust company should keep on deposit with the trus-
tees at all times securities worth 110 per cent of the principal face
value of all outstanding participation bonds. Because of the de-
pressed market conditions, securities held by the trustees fell con-
siderably below these amounts, and as a result, on the trust com-
pany's insolvency the bondholder-beneficiaries suffered loss. The
court surcharged the trustees, emphasizing that it was their lack
of diligence in failing to examine the value of pledged securities
that resulted in loss. The additional fact appeared that the trustees
were officers of the trust company and thus had special knowledge
of the circumstances which led to the loss. The decision of the
court is clearly correct since the requirement of adequate security
was for the very purpose of guarding the beneficiaries against loss
due to market decline and other conditions. So, too, where a trus-
tee ignored the settlor's express direction to sell certain real estate
in 1926 and reinvest in certain bonds, the court held the trustee
2 5 Trustees who fail to segregate or earmark trust property are generally
held responsible for any loss which results regardless of the cause of loss. This
is based on the theory that the practice should be discouraged and that pe-
nallzing the trustee will further such purpose. RESTATEMENT, TRusTs § 179
(1935); BOGERT, TRusTs Am TRUsTEEs § 596 (1946).
26 Miller v. Pender, 93 N.L 1, 34 A. 2d 663 (1943); Chapter House Circle
ef King's Daughters v. Hartford National Bank and Trust Co., 124 Conn. 151,
199 At. 110 (1938); Rotzin v. Miller, 134 Neb. 8, 277 N.W. 811 (1938); BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs § 596 (1946); ScOTT, TRUSTs § 205.1 (1939).
2 7 First National Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hospital, 288 Mass. 35, 192
NE. 150 (1934).
28 16 N.J. Misc. 234, 198 Atl. 855 (1938), affd, 125 N.J. Eq. 360, 5 A. 2d
778 (1939).
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surchargeable for loss that resulted from failure to convert.2 9 In
determining the amount of such surcharge, the court said it would
have to consider the market value of the real estate during the
year or two after it came into the trustee's possession and what
the present financial position of the estate would have been if the
trustee had bought the bonds as directed. Similarly, a trustee must
bear the loss which results if he fails to sell "non-legal" securi-
ties within a reasonable time during periods of prosperity and then
sells in a depression at a great loss,30 invests in "non-legals" dur-
ing the depression,3' fails to sell during a declining market when
he has knowledge of facts which indicate that holding the securi-
ties is extremely hazardous,32 ignores expert advice to sell,33 or re-
tains investments in order to profit personally.34 In short, in the
foregoing situations in which the trustee has been surcharged, the
facts clearly showed a breach of trust which directly resulted in
loss.
In other situations in which there is no clear breach of trust
resulting in loss, the court's determination of liability depends on a
balancing of delicate factors indicating whether the trustee has
acted reasonably. A variety of elements are considered. Reason-
able care requires the trustee to be "enlightened and guided by
the approved rules applicable to investment of trust funds, not by
his uninformed personal judgment ... ."3s A diligent fiduciary
should examine the investments with care in light of the economic
conditions and desire of the settlor. He should study financial state-
ments and current business reports of the companies whose securi-
ties are held.36 He should consult with persons experienced in the
investment field,37 as well as considering investment services and
the like.38 Thus, where trust investments "were examined and con-
29 In re Nola's Estate, 333 Pa. 106, 3 A. 2d 327 (1939).
3o Paul v. Girard Trust Co., 124 F. 2d 809 (7th Cir. 1941); In re Frances'
Estate, 245 App. Div. 675, 284 N. Y. Supp. 153 (1935).
31 Merchant's National Bank of Aurora v. Frazier 329 Ill. App. 191, 67
N. 2d 611 (1946).
3Z In re Conover's Trusteeship, 50 Ohio Supp. 330 (1933).
33 In re Busby's Estate, 288 Ill. App. 500, 6 N.E. 2d 451 (1937).
34 In re Stumpp's Estate, 153 Misc. 92, 274 N.Y. Supp. 466 (1934).
3S In re Allis' Estate, 191 Wis. 23, 209 N.W. 945 (1926); rehearing denied,
210 N.W. 418 (1927); In re Taylor, 277 Pa. 518, 121 Atl. 310 (1931).
36 In re Kent's Estate, 146 Misc. 155, 261 N.Y. Supp. 698 (1932), afJ'd, 246
App. Div. 604, 284 N.Y. Supp. 976, leave to appeal denied, 270 N.Y. 675 (1936);
In re Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 21 A. 2d 72 (1941).
37 In re Bunker's Estate, 184 Misc. 315, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 746 (1944); Casani's
Estate, 324 Pa. 468, 21 A. 2d 59 (1941).
38 In re Bunker's Estate, ibid; In re Kent's Estate, supra note 37; Welch
v. Welch, 235 Wis. 282, 290 N.W. 758 (1940).
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sidered by a committee of the trustee's directors at least once in
every six months," and the committee was composed of financiers
who were members of the New York Stock Exchange, the court re-
fused to surcharge.39 In Lentz's Estate,4° the investments were con-
sidered daily by the research department of the trustee's trust de-
partment; a special investment committee of the trust department
met several times each week and considered the trust portfolio.
From 1926 to 1941 the investments were examined some 679 times.
This was the critical factor in the court's refusal to surcharge in
spite of expert testimony that the trustee failed to do its duty.
But in another situation in which no such meeting was held for
over two and one-half years to consider the trust investments, the
trustee was held surchargeable.4'
While it is obvious that a trustee might make a prudent deci-
sion as to investment, retention or sale of securities based simply
on his own judgment, the courts have emphasized the above noted
circumstances in refusing to surcharge in the depression cases.
Whether the decision was in fact prudent will depend on the state
of facts existing at the time the trustee acts.42
The trustee may not speculate with trust funds, but may in-
vest in or retain "seasoned" securities.43 Where the trustee has in-
vested in such securities which are gradually declining along with
practically all other investments, it would be unsound to require
that the trustee sell them and attempt to find a better investment
in view of his duty to conserve over extended periods of time in-
volving both periods of depression and inflation.44 Moreover, while
"seasoned" securities may decline in monetary value, in terms of
extrinsic value or purchasing power, their value usually remains
firm.4 As one court said, the "decision to sell in a declining market
is perhaps the most difficult decision to make in the administration
of a trust,' 46 and the courts have been unable to state at just what
39 Re Fulton Trust Co. of New York, 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931).
40 364 Pa. 304, 72 A. 2d 276 (1950).
41 In re Junkersfeld's Estate, 244 App. Div. 260, 279 N.Y. Supp. 481 (1935).
42 First National Bank of Boston v. Truesdale Hospital, 288 Mass. 35, 192
N.. 150 (1934).
43 A determination as to whether a stock is "seasoned" may be made by
looking to these factors: "What has been the history of the companies during a
period of years? Have they paid dividends of regular amounts? Have they
a proper capital structure? Are they wisely officered? Has a successful busi-
ness continued over a period of time? Have they achieved a standing in com-
mercial circles? Have they behind them an established dividend record over
a period of years?" In re Winburn's Will, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N.Y. Supp. 758
(1931).
4 4 In re Cross' Estate, 117 N.J. Eq. 429, 443, 176 Atl. 101, 103 (1935).
45 See In re Busby's Estate, 288 IlM. App. 500, 6 N.E. 2d 451 (1937); In re
Linnard's Estate, 299 Pa. 32, 148 Atl. 912 (1930).
4 6 In re Feinberg's Estate, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 879, 883 (N.Y. Surr. 1948).
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point a sale must be made to avoid liability. In Lazar's Estate,47
the trustee sold "seasoned" securities soon after the depression start-
ed, and he was held not surchargeable. Failure to sell until late
in the depression has also been held a reasonable exercise of dis-
creation.48 The difficulties of making a decision to sell seasoned se-
curities is well illustrated by In re Pate's Estate.49 Included in the
trust assets were 10,000 shares of securities valued at $10,000 in
1919 when the trust was created. By 1928 the stock had risen in
value to some $400,000 and in 1929 to $900,000. During this period
dividends of $42,000 had been paid. In 1946 the trustee sold the
stock for $30,000. The beneficiaries claimed the trustee should be
surcharged, but the court refused. It said the trustee had acted
reasonably when viewed prospectively "unaided or unenlightened
by subsequent events." Where, however, the securities are highly
speculative, a trustee is usually liable for failure promptly to sell.50
But even here when the trust came into existence during a period
of depression, great sympathy for the plight of the trustee is shown.
Thus, in St. Louis Trust Union Co. v. Stoffregen,5 ' the trustees ob-
tained certain German and Chilean bonds from the estate of the
settlor. Trustee failed to sell and the bonds depreciated in value.
On the beneficiaries seeking to surcharge, the court said: "When
the defendants became the trustees on February 26, 1931, we were
in the midst of the 1929-32 world-wide depression. They were faced
with a dilemma - a dilemma not easily soluble. Should they sacri-
fice the securities in the existing panicky feeling and put the trust
to loss, or should they retain the securities with the hope that a
return to normal conditions would restore the value of the securi-
ties." Certainly, the lack of a market or the existence of an ex-
tremely small market is a defense to surcharge, even though the
securities may be speculative.5 2
In Busby's EstateS3 the trust estate arose during the depression
and consisted of speculative stock bought on margin. The trustee
failed to sell promptly, and as a result the estate became insolvent.
The court, distinguishing other cases, surcharged the trustee on
the theory that prompt sale was necessary and urgent to meet
debts. Similarly, when a trustee invests in non-speculative stocks
47 139 Misc. 261, 247 N.Y. Supp. 230 (1932).
4 8 Central Hanover Bank and Trust v. Brown, 30 N.Y.S. 2d 85 (1941).
4 9 In re Pate's Estate, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 853 (N.Y. Surr. 1948).
50 In re Ward's Estate, 121 N.J. Eq. 555, 192 Ati. 63 (1936), afd, 121 N.J.
Eq. 606, 191 Atl. 772 (1937); Miller's Estate, 345 Pa. 91, 26 A. 2d 320 (1942).
5' 40 N.Y.S. 2d 527 (1942), affd., 43 N.Y.S. 2d 511 (1943). See also Pollack
v. Bowman, 139 N. J. Eq. 47, 49 A. 2d 40 (1946).
52 In re Stumpp's Estate, 153 Misc. 92, 274 N.Y. Supp. 466 (1934); Blauvelt
v. Citizens Trust Co., 3 N. . 545, 71 A. 2d 184 (1950).
53 288 IM. App. 500, 6 N.E. 2d 451 (1937).
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on a margin account, he may be held liable for resulting loss, since
this is speculation and violates his duty of conservation. 54
While some courts have held that there -will be no surcharge
if the decline in values and resulting loss was caused by a "sud-
den and unexpected" catastrophe (as distinguished from a gradual
decline) so that there is neither time nor opportunity to sell,55 this
factor should be important only if the trustee is under some duty
to sell, as where the investment is speculative, and the fulfillment
of this duty is thwarted by lack of time. In any event if he sells
at a proper time and price, he is not liable if the investment sold
later rises in value.56
The courts have indicated that a distinction must be drawn be-
tween the cases where the trustee retains stock on a declining mar-
ket awaiting the arrival of a more favorable time to sell, and the
cases where he purchases stock on a declining market. Such a dis-
tinction seems justified since, in the former case, in order to carry
out his primary duty of conservation he should be given discretion
to retain without liability in the hope of a more favorable market;57
but in the latter situation the trustee, as a reasonable man, must
invest in a more stable investment, such as bonds, for he is only
secondarily interested in profits which might result if the stocks
were later to rise.53 It has been held, however, in a state where
"the prudent man rule" is followed, that the power of a trustee to
retain investments in a violently fluctuating market is not greatly
dissimilar to his power to invest, so the trustee must exercise reas-
onable care in disposing of such securities and reinvesting, and if
he does not, he is liable for loss.59 In Dickerson v. Camden Trust
54 Mellier's Estate, 312 Pa. 157. 167 Ati. 358 (1933).
55 In re Ward's Estate, supra note 51. There the trustee was given $60,000
in trust for certain specified purposes. After the depression started the trus-
tee accepted, in lieu of cash, shares of stock at their appraised value although
their actual value was much lower. The court in surcharging emphasized that
the stocks declined gradually, and distinguished cases where there had been
a sudden and unexpected catastrophe. However, the trustee was guilty of
breach of trust in accepting stock instead of cash, and in failing to diversify.
See also Security Trust v. Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S.W. 2d 70 (1946) where
dividends were paid until the crash, and the stock had an excellent reputation;
In re Paterson National Bank, 125 N.J. Eq. 73, 4 A. 2d 59 (1939) where stock
enjoyed a gradual rise for more than a quarter of a century and continued
to rise until 1933, when it suddenly dropped. See also Welch v. Welch, 235
Wis. 282, 290 N.W. 758 (1940); In re Stafford's Estate, 69 N.E. 2d 208 (Ohio
App. 1946).56 In re Ryan's Will, 188 Misc. 61, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 416 (1945), aff'd, 272 App.
Div. 799, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 926 (1947).
57 In re Weinberg's Will, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 748 (1946); In re Kent's Estate, 146
Misc. 155, 261 N.Y. Supp. 698 (1932).
S In -re Ward's Estate, supra note 51.
59 Mclnnes v. Whitman, 313 Mass. 19, 46 N.E. 2d 527 (1943); Clark v. Clark
167 Ga. 1, 144 S.E. 781, 158 S.E. 297 (1931).
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Co.,6 0 the trust instrument specifically directed the executor-trus-
tees to invest the residue of the estate in legal securities. The trust
arose during the depression and values were declining rapidly.
The executors, instead of selling non-legals and reinvesting the
proceeds, retained the investments which came to them from the
settlor's estate, and turned them over to themselves as trustees at
their inventory, instead of depreciated market value. The court,
in surcharging the trustees for the difference between inventory
and market value, stressed the failure to obey the express direction
of the settlor to invest in legals, and distinguished contrary cases
where no such express direction appeared. The court said the test
of reasonableness did not apply here since the trustees acted beyond
the limits of their power by accepting non-legals. This seems un-
warranted, for while it is the duty of a fiduciary to dispose of non-
legals in all cases, he should be, and usually is, given reasonable
discretion in determining a favorable time to sell. As pointed out
in Feinberg's Estate, 1 where certain securities were declared non-
legals in 1929 and 1930, there was no imperative duty to sell at any
particular time during the depression in view of optimistic predic-
tions of recovery.
In a number of cases the courts have emphasized that the in-
vestment in question was made by the settlor.62 The fact that the
settlor invested in such securities reflects his confidence in them,
and implies a desire that such securities be retained, and may be
a justification for retention by the trustees in a declining market,
in the absence of other factors which might compel sale. Similarly,
if the testator has been active in the corporation whose securities
are involved, the courts tend to refuse surcharge. 3 However, a
trustee is to be guided by the standard of reasonable care, and the
mere fact that the settlor may have been imprudent in his own
investments should be no defense. Moreover, the conditions of the
corporation may have drastically changed between the time settlor
invested and the time at which trustee must make a decision either
to sell or retain. Certainly, in the usual case, this factor should
have little weight.
The question as to whether the corporate fiduciary should be
held to a stricter rule of accountability than the individual in the
601 N.J. 459, 64 A. 2d 214 (1949).
6182 N.Y.S. 2d 879 (N.Y. Surr. 1948). See also Scow, ThusTs § 230 (1939).
62 In re Winburn's Will, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N.Y. Supp. 758 (1931). For sum-
mary of cases arising out of earlier depressions see Note, 77 A.L.R. 505 (1932).
63 Poor v. Hodge, 311 Mass. 312, 41 N.E. 2d 21 (1942); In re McCann's Will,
212 Minn. 233, 3 N.W. 2d 226 (1942); In re Easton's Estate, 178 Misc. 511, 35
N.Y.S. 2d 546 (1942), affd, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 190 (1943).
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depression cases has not definitely been passed upon,64 although
there has been some indication that a stricter rule should apply.
The courts, however, generally fail to consider the question.
In conclusion, it may be said that in a period of economic ab-
normality, a trustee who invests in or retains seasoned securities,
who makes frequent examination of their status, and who informs
his beneficiaries of the problems involved, acting throughout in
good faith, need not fear surcharge by a court of equity.
WB=n T=m TRUST IWSTRmEmNT CONTAwNS AN
EXCULPATORY CLAUSE
Should a fiduciary whose conduct with respect to investments
would ordinarily be regarded as a breach of trust be protected
against surcharge by exculpatory language in the trust instrument?
Or is the standard of ordinary care and prudence such a basic in-
cident of the fiduciary relation that an attempt to exempt a trustee
from the requirement should be held nugatory as a matter of policy?
In general the courts, particularly if attention is paid to what
they say rather than to what they do, have chosen the first alterna-
tive and have held exculpatory provisions to be valid and enforce-
able.6s Thus, courts have recognized as effective clauses which pro-
vided that the trustee shall be under no liability for investment
losses occurring without "wilful default,"66 "malfeasance in office," 67
"wilful fraud or neglect, ' 68 "gross neglect or wilful malfeasance" 69
and "gross negligence or wilful and intentional breach of trust."70
Approval has likewise been given to provisions inserted in clauses
giving the trustee powers of investment or retention of investments
to the effect that he shall be under "no liability" for acts done in
64 ScoTT, TausTs § 174.1 (1939); BOGERT, TRUSTS Am TRusuTs § 541 (1946).
RESTATEmENT, TRusTs § 227, comment d; In re Busby's Estate, 288 IMI. App. 500,
6 N.E. 2d 451 (1937); In re Baker's Estate, 249 App. Div. 265, 292 N.Y. Supp.
122 (1936). In re Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 21 A. 2d 72 (1941).
6S On the general effect of exculpatory provisions see 42 YALE L. J. 359
(1932); 26 CoRNELL L. Q. 165 (1940); 22 VA. L. Rv. 455 (1936); PESTATEmENT,
TusTs § 222 (1935); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs § 542 (1946); ScoTT, TRusTs
§ 222 (1939). The comparable question of exculpatory clauses limiting the lia-
bility of corporate trustees under bond security indentures is omitted as not
relevant to investment problems. See 42 HaRV. L. REv. 198 (1928); 31 ILL. L.
REv. 1060 (1937); 48 YALE L. J. 533 (1939); 19 CoRNERLL L. Q. 171 (1934); 29
Mcx. L. REv. 355 (1930); 36 MicH. L. REV. 996 (1938); 37 COL. L. REv. 130
(1937).
6 6 New England Trust Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. 542, 59 N.E. 2d 263 (1945),
320 Mass. 482, 70 N.E. 2d 6 (1947).6 7 Gardner v. Squire, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 234, 49 N.E. 2d 587 (1942).
6 8 In re Comfort's Estate, 176 Misc. 807, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 166 (1941).
6 9 In re Jarvis' Estate, 110 Misc. 5, 180 N.Y. Supp. 324 (1920).
7
o Gouley v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., 329 Pa. 465, 198 Atl. 7 (1938).
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that connection 71 or shall be excused for all such acts "done in
good faith."72 The New York legislature, however, has taken the
other view. A statute passed in 193673 provides that the attempted
grant to an executor or testamentary trustee of exoneration from
liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, diligence and pru-
dence shall be deemed contrary to public policy and be void.
Even though the approach of the courts has been that exculpa-
tory clauses are valid and effective, it is clear that they will not
perform the function of broadening the investment powers of the
trustee. This is illustrated by In re Rushmore's Estate.74 The ac-
count of trustees was attacked because of their investment in, and
retention of, non-legals. They claimed to have authority to go out-
side the legal list by virtue of a clause in the trust instrument di-
recting that they were not to be held liable for any act done in good
faith. The court held them liable. It said the exculpatory language
did not enlarge their investment powers but only restricted liability
for acts done in good faith within the powers and authority con-
ferred on the trustees. Hence it did not protect them when they
did not abide by the list of legals. 75
The investing fiduciary, moreover, cannot rely on the general
approval of exculpatory language as a protection against potential
surcharge. There is an area of action in which such provisions will
avail him nothing. The most succinct description of the area ap-
pears in the Restatement of Trusts.76 It states that an exculpatory
clause is not effective to relieve a trustee if he acted in bad faith,
or with intent to breach, or with reckless indifference to the bene-
ficiary's interest. Nor will such a clause permit the trustee to re-
tain a profit he made from a breach of trust.77 Most of the courts
seem to agree with these limitations whether they have considered
7 1 In re City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 270 App. Div. 572, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 484
(1946); Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. Super. 196, 70 A. 2d 784
(1950).
72 North Adams Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180 N.E. 217 (1932).
73 N.Y. Laws 1936, c. 378, § 125 (Decedent Estate Law), as amended Laws
1938, c. 392. It is clear from the statutory language that the act does not ap-
ply to living trusts. Application of Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 176
Misc. 183, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 924 (1941).
7421 N.Y.S. 2d 526 (N.Y. Surr. 1940).
75 The court cited with approval ScoTr, TRUSTS § 222.1 (1939) and BOGERT,
TaUSTS AxD TRusTEES § 542 (1946).
76 § 222.
7 7 In addition, an exculpatory clause may be disregarded or stricken out
by reformation if its presence in the trust instrument is accounted for by fraud,
overreaching or abuse of a fiduciary relation on the part of the trustee. Tbid,
subsection (3); Jothann v. Irving Trust Co., 151 lisc. 107, 270 N.Y. Supp. 72
(1934).
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them together or separately.78
The general approval of and limitations upon exculpatory pro-
visions give the courts a wide interpretive power in deciding wheth-
er to surcharge the trustee. In the first place, was his act or omis-
sion within the exempting language of the provision? Here the
courts continue to adhere to the doctrine of "strict construction"
of the clause.7 9 Secondly, was the act or omission of the trustee
within the area in which it is deemed against policy to permit ex-
culpation?
In an Ohio case80 a clause in the instrument stated that the
trustee was not to be liable except for "malfeasance in office." He
retained some hotel bonds even though he may have had actual
knowledge that the security for them was in a precarious condi,
tion. The bonds became worthless. The court held that the trustee
was not liable. It said, rather technically, that the loss resulted
from the trustee's failure or omission to act but not from malfea-
sance, so the clause protected him. The court might well have con-
sidered the question of whether the trustee had committed a reck-
less or intentional breach of trust and hence should not be pro-
tected as a matter of policy. However, the fact that the beneficiaries
prepared the trust instrument carried great weight with the court.
In Jarvis Estate81 trustees invested in rapid transit bonds early
in 1916 and retained them until late 1918. The market had steadily
declined due to war conditions, price and wage inflation and the
act of the Government in granting fare and freight increases to
the standard carriers under its control. The will exempted the
trustees from liability except for "gross neglect or wilful malfea-
sance." The court nevertheless surcharged them with a portion
of the loss. It said it was gross neglect to retain the bonds so
long under such conditions. The result is somewhat questionable.
The trustees might have been held to have failed to exercise or-
dinary judgment and prudence and thus to have been protected by
the exculpatory language, particularly in view of the reluctance of
most courts to choose a point in a market disturbed by unusual
conditions when the trustees should have sold.82
Further illustration of the interpretive power is found in an
early and leading American case.83 The will exempted the trustees
78 In re Kramer's Estate, 172 Misc. 598, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 700 (1939); Gouley v.
Land Title Bank & Trust Co., 329 Pa. 465, 198 Atl. 7 (1938); New England Trust
Co. v. Paine, 317 Mass. 542, 59 N.E. 2d 263 (1945); BOGERT, TAusTs A D ThUSTEES
§ 542, pp. 370 et seq. (1946).
79 Farr v. First Camden National Bank & Trust Co., 4 N.J. Super. 89, 66
A. 2d 444 (1949); Blauvelt v. Citizens Trust Co., 3 N. J. 545, 71 A. 2d 184 (1950).
90 Gardner v. Squire, 38 Ohio L. Abs 234, 49 N.E. 2d 587 (1942).
81110 Misc. 5, 180 N.Y. Supp. 324 (1920).
82 See discussion preceding sub-topic.
83 Crabb v. Young, 92 N.Y. 56, 65, 66 (1883).
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from any loss or damage except that occurring from "their own
wilful default, misconduct or neglect." The lower court surcharged
them for loss in connection with the investment in some real estate
bonds and mortgages. In reversing, the appellate court said, "It
is quite clear that they cannot be held liable to replace the moneys
lost through even an improvident or careless investment unless they
have acted wilfully and have intentionally disregarded the rules
which control and regulate the action of prudent and careful men
in conducting their own business affairs."84
The conclusion seems justified that the language of the exculpa-
tory clause is simply another factor to be weighed by the courts
in deciding the question of surcharge according to what they be-
lieve to be the equities of the particular case.
Should a corporate trustee gain the same immunity from sur-
charge under exculpatory clauses as would be given to an individual
trustee in similar circumstances? Professor Scott says that there
has been a "growing feeling" of late that the answer should be nega-
tive.8s Professor Bogert agrees, finding such clauses of "question-
able ethical quality" when applied to a corporate trustee.86 Other
writers have expressed comparable sentiments.87 So far, there is
little direct authority. The courts in a number of cases have in-
ferentially answered the stated question in the affirmative by rec-
ognizing the validity of exoneration provisions in cases which in
fact involved corporate trustees.88 At least one court has held, when
the point was squarely raised, that there is no distinction between
the professional and the amateur. In New England Trust Co. v.
Paine,89 an exculpatory clause provided that the corporate trustee
was not to be liable for "involuntarily losses" nor to make good to
the estate anything lost except by its "own wilful default." The
trustee was guilty of a protracted delay in selling shares of the New
84 Compare another leading American case decided the same year, Tuttle
V. Gilmore, 37 N.J. Eq. 617 (1883) where a trustee who took second mortgages
without proper investigation was held to have committed a wilful and inten-
tional breach and hence derived no protection from a clause exempting him
from liability except for "wilful and intentional breaches of trust."
85 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 222.3 p. 179 (1939).
86 BoGmRT, TRusTs Ams TausTms § 541 p. 362 (1946); BOGERT, CASES ON
TaUSTS, 395n (2d ed. 1950).87 See Shinn, Exoneration Clauses in Trust Instruments, 42 YArE L. J. 359,
374 et seq. (1932); Kramer, Effect of Exculpatory Clauses on the Liability of
Corporate Trustees, 36 MVscH. L. Rzv. 996, 999 (1938).88 Farr v. First Camden National Bank & Trust Co., 4 N.J. Super. 89, 66
A. 2d 444 (1949); Liberty Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. Super. 196, 70 A.
2d 784 (1950); Blauvelt v. Citizens Trust Co., 3 N.J. 545, 71 A 2d 184 (1950).
89 317 Mass. 542, 59 N.E. 2d 263 (1945); 320 Mass. 482, 70 N.E. 2d 6 (1947);
Compare In re Clark's Will, 136 Misc. 881, 242 N.Y. Supp. 210, 220 (1930),
rev'd, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931).
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Haven Railroad and had a disproportionately large investment in
the securities of the Boston & Maine system. The court held that
the trustee was not subject to surcharge. It said that the acts of
the trustee were at most failures to exercise the degree of judg-
ment ordinarily required, but did not amount to bad faith or to
intentional breaches of trust. Hence the exculpatory language ex-
onerated the trustee. The court admitted that the safeguards equity
supplies for trust beneficiaries "should not be softened first for
the benefit of trust companies and professional trustees who hold
themselves out as fully conversant with the duties of trustees and
fully competent to perform them." But, it said, exculpatory pro-
visions are, with certain limitations, valid and there is nothing in
the law withholding their protection from a corporate trustee when
it would be granted to an individual.
The writers submit that the courts should hold it to be against
public policy for a corporate trustee to avoid liability for a breach
of trust through the presence of an exculpatory clause in the trust
instrument. Surely there is a wide difference between the amateur
trustee and the professional in this regard. The amateur is usually
a relative or friend of the settlor, chosen for reasons of personal
confidence or familiarity with family relationships. In such a case
it is natural for the settlor to recognize that the fiduciary is a per-
son of ordinary ability and to desire the administration of the trust
not to be an undue burden. Accordingly, if exoneration provisions
are placed in the trust instrument, it is perfectly proper to hold them
effective within the limits previously indicated. The professionals,
however, seek the business. Corporate trustees advertise or rep-
resent that they specialize in fiduciary administration, employ ex-
perts and have systems of checks and balances between their trust
officers and their investment and other committees. It seems im-
proper for them to seek to escape the responsibility which they
have thus invited.
One or two analogies for the result advocated do not seem too
remote. In cases not involving exculpatory clauses, recognition has
been given to the fact that corporate trustees who hold themselves
out as having special skill and special facilities should be held for
the skill and facilities they profess to have.90 In the law of security,
the doctrine of strictissimi juris, inherent in the situation of the in-
dividual surety is held by the courts to be inapplicable to the cor-
porate surety.91 It should therefore not require a statute to for-
bid the shelter of exculpatory provisions to the professional trustee.
9O See In re Allis Estate, 191 Wis. 23, 209 N.W. 945 (1926); Scorr, TRusTS §
174.1 (1939); BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TausTEs § 541 p. 360 (1946).
91 The Royal Indemnity Co. v. The Northern Ohio Granite & Stone Co., 100
Ohio St 373, 126 N.. 405 (1919); Meyer v. Building & Realty Service Co., 209
Ind. 125, 196 N.E. 250 (1935); Forest City Building & Loan Assn. v. Davis, 192
N.C. 108,133 S.E. 530 (1926); Note, 12 A.L.R. 382 (1921).
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WmmE Tim BENEmcARY CONSENTS To OR ACQUIESCES
IN THE BREACH
A beneficiary who is not under a legal incapacity may be pre-
cluded from surcharging a trustee for breach of an investment duty
because of what may broadly be termed "consent." Conceivably
the courts might have hesitated to entertain consent of the bene-
ficiary as a defense by the trustee.92 At least one of the main pur-
poses of the average settlor in creating the trust is to substitute
the judgment of the trustee concerning the investment and preser-
vation of the estate for that of the beneficiaries. This purpose is
frustrated if the trustee is permitted to escape liability when he
either yields to the demands of the beneficiary or secures his con-
"sent, in making or retaining an improper investment. Nevertheless,
the spectacle of a beneficiary turning on his trustee with a demand
for surcharge after he has approved the breach is not an attrac-
tive one. Therefore the courts have chosen to permit the defense
with strict limitations as to the capacity and knowledge of the bene-
ficiary and the conduct of the trustee.93
The consent of the beneficiary may have been given before or
at the time of the breach,94 or after the breach.9 5 In the former situa-
tion the common basis of refusing surcharge is "estoppel," or the
"clean hands doctrine.19 6 In the latter, the result is said by Pro-
fessor Bogert to be grounded on ratification, although here, too, the
courts frequently speak in terms of estoppel.9 7 In most cases where
there is ratification, the elements of estoppel are present, for normal-
92 Especially is this true in the spendthrift trust cases. Yet even there the
beneficiary may be precluded from holding the trustee on the basis of "con-
sent". See SCOTT, TRUSTS § 216.1 (1939).
93 See generally, RESTATEBENT, TRUSTS §8 216-219 (1935); BoGERT, TRUSTS
AmI TRUSTEES §§ 941-944 (1946); ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 216-219 (1939).94 Blauvelt v. Citizens Trust Co., 3 N.J. 545, 71 A. 2d 184 (1950); Washing-
ton Loan and Trust Co. v. Colby, 108 F. 2d 743 (D. C. Cir. 1939); Mann v. Day,
199 Mich. 88, 165 N.W. 643 (1917); Baker v. Thompson, 181 App. Div. 469, 163
N.Y. Supp. 871 (1918); In re Mlattison's Will, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 734 (1940); RESTATE-
mExT, TRUSTS § 216 (1935); 19 Mnum. L. Rzv. 347 (1935); U-nmoam TRusTs ACT
§18.
9S Washington Loan and Trust Co. v. Colby, 108 F. 2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Alexander v. Kotzen, 19 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (1940); In re Walton's Estate, 348 Pa.
143, 34 A. 2d 484 (1943); 348 Pa. 143, 34 A. 2d 484 (1943); Rodick v. Piner, 120
Me. 160, 113 AUt. 45 (1921); Blauvelt v. Citizens Trust Co., 3 N.J. 545, 71 A. 2d
184 (1950); 14 So. CAIn]. L. REv. 355 (1941); RESTATE==ET, TRUSTS § 218 (1935).
96 In re Wildenburg's Estate, 117 Misc. 49, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 895 (1941); Boon v.
Hall, 76 App. Div. 520, 78 N.Y. Supp. 557 (1902); BOGERT, TRUSTS Am TRUSTEES
. 941 (1946). See cases cited in note 95, supra.
97 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 942 p. 146 (1946); In re Wildenburg's
Estate, 117 Misc. 49, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 896 (1941); Pollack v. Bowman, 39 N.J. Eq.
.47, 49 A. 2d 40 (1946); Liberty Title and Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. Super. 196,
:70 A. 2d 784 (1949), 6 N.J. 28, 77 A. 2d 219 (1950).
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ly after ratification the trustee in reliance either acts positively or
fails to take steps to repair the breach.9s Professor Scott, on the
other hand, supports the cases involving post-breach consent on the
theory that the beneficiary has made an election of remedies to
affirm the transaction, rather than set it aside 9 It is believed un-
necessary to choose between these points of view for the decisions
amply demonstrate that it is an adoption of a course of action by
which the beneficiary is bound. A beneficiary may also be pre-
cluded from objecting to a breach on the basis of contract or re-
lease of his right of action10o
It is frequently stated that a competent beneficiary who with
full knowledge of the facts and of his legal rights expressly con-
sents to or affirms an investment by the trustee cannot, in the ab-
sence of fraud, thereafter question its propriety.10 1 When the basis
of consent is a release of the trustee he must, in addition, show
the fairness of the transaction and adequate consideration.10 2 Simi-
larly, where -consent is urged as a defense and the breach com-
plained of is a sale of property by the trustee to himself, the last
two factors must be shown. 0 3 This is but another application of
the rule that a trustee who dealt for himself with his beneficiary
must prove that he acted not only in utmost good faith and after
full disclosure, but fairly.104
The requirement that the beneficiary have full knowledge of
his legal rights is an extraordinary one and somewhat difficult to
prove. Perhaps it may be more accurately stated as requiring thai
the beneficiary either know or should know of his rights. 0 5 How-
9 8 BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRusTEEs § 942 p. 146n (1946).
99 Scorr, TRusTs § 218 (1939). See BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRusTEEs § 945
(1939) for criticism.
100 In re Peck's Estate, 323 Mich. 11, 34 N.W. 2d 533 (1948); Riggs v. Lowree,
189 Md. 437, 56 A. 2d 152 (1947); Burns v. Skogstad, 69 Idaho 227, 206 P. 2d
765 (1949); RESTATmEmT, TRUSTS § 217 (1935).
101 In re Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A. 2d 71 (1940). See also Mer-
chant's National Bank of Aurora v. Frazier, 329 ]1l. App. 191, 67 N.E. 2d 611
(1946); Liberty Title -and Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. Super. 196, 70 A. 2d 784
(1949), 6 N.J. 28, 77 A. 2d 219 (1950); Pennsylvania Co. Etc. v. Gillmore, 142
N.J. Eq. 27, 59 A. 2d 24 (1948); Burns v. Skogstad, 69 Idaho 227, 206 P. 2d 765
(1949); BOGERT, TRusTs m) TRusTE.s §§ 941, 943 (1946); ScOTT, TRusTs § 216
(1939).
102 Ingram v. Lewis, 37 F. 2d 259 (1th Cir. 1930); Wool Growers Service
Corporation v. Ragan, 18 Wash. 2d 655, 140 P. 2d 512 (1943), rehearing denied,
141 P. 2d 875 (1943).
103 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 942 p. 140 (1946).
104 Goldman v. Kaplan, 170 F. 2d 503 (4th Cir. 1948); In re Dawes' Estate,
12 N.Y.S. 2d 6 (N.Y. Surr. 1939); Liberty Title and Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J.
Super. 196, 70 A. 2d 784 (1949), 6 N.J. 28, 77 A. 2d 219 (1950); ScoTr, TusTs §
216.3 (1939).
105 Pennsylvania Co., Etc. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 59 A. 2d 24 (1948).
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ever, the courts appear to place little emphasis on this factor in
the actual decision of the cases, and seem to assume that if the
beneficiary is competent and knows all of the relevant facts, he is
cognizant of his legal position. The real elements, therefore, which
control the decisions of the courts are the beneficiary's knowledge
of the facts and his approval or assent.10 6
Knowledge on the part of the beneficiary may of course be
shown by written10 7 or oral evidence'0 8 or implied from the cir-
cumstances of the case. Proof that the beneficiary received month-
ly statements which contained an account of principal and income
has been held to be a sufficient showing of knowledge.10 9 But in
another case it was held that the mere fact that the beneficiaries
were informed of the investments by an annual statement was not
sufficient.1 10 The receipt of income by the beneficiaries without ob-
jection to the non-legal securities which were its source did not
create an estoppel when the trustee failed to show affirmatively that
the beneficiaries were competent and aware of the facts."1 ' A simi-
lar problem may arise as a result of an accounting by the trustee.
Thus, in Isham v. Union County Trust Co., 12 the trustee field an
account in 1940, which was approved by the court. Exceptions
were made to a second account filed in 1949 on the ground that
the trustee prior to 1940 had been guilty of self-dealing in buying
certain mortgages. The court said that the fact that the vouchers
of the 1940 account, if examined, would have revealed the chal-
lenged transactions, was not enough in the absence of disclosure
by the trustee or other circumstances which would put the bene-
ficiary on notice.
Assuming that knowledge is shown, the courts find the require-
106A Rationalization of Trust Surcharge Cases, 96 U. oF PA. L. REV. 647
(1948).
107 In re Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A. 2d 71 (1940).
1081n re Linnard's Estate, 16 Pa. D. and C. 143 (1931).
109In re Curran's Estate, 17 Pa. D and C. 435 (1932), aff'd, 312 Pa. 416,
167 Ati. 597 (1933); In re Wilbur's Estate, 334 Pa. 45, 5 A. 2d 325 (1939).
110Merchant's National Bank of Aurora v. Frazier, 329 M. App. 191, 67
NE. 2d 611 (1946).
111 Paul v. Girard Trust Co., 124 F. 2d 809 (7th Cir. 1941).
112 7 N.J. Super. 488, 71 A. 2d 902 (1950). It should be noted in this con-
nection that the beneficiaries may be precluded from holding the trustee liable
for breach of trust by the approval of the court of the trustee's account. In
general the settlement of an account renders res judicata all matters in dispute
and determined by the court in the settlement of the account, and all matters
which were open to dispute although not actually disputed, and this although
the account was an intermediate and not a final account. The account may be
reopened if the trustee was guilty of concealment or misrepresentation in pre-
senting his account or gaining approval. See Bogert, Trusts and Estates § 973(1935). But see In re Edward's Estate, 360 Pa. 504, 62 A. 2d 763 (1948); In re
Solomon's Will, 175 Misc. 64, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 72 (1940).
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ment of approval or assent in various acts of the beneficiary. Ex-
press assent, either written"3 or oral,114 is, of course, the desired
objective of the trustee. While the courts are not all in accord,
usually assent is not found in mere failure to object"15 unless the
circumstances placed the beneficiary under a duty to speak.116 As
the New Jersey court put it, to find assent in such failure, the bene-
ficiary must be shown to have acted deliberately in not objecting
to an investment to which he knew he could object." 7 In any event,
failure to object may continue so long that the beneficiary is barred
on the basis of laches, especially if the trustee acts to his detri-
ment."8 If failure to object is combined with receipt of benefits, it
is generally held that assent has been given. 119 In the cases which
depend on estoppel, assent may be retracted at any time before the
trustee has acted to his detriment.120
If there are several beneficiaries,' 2 ' or if there are successive
beneficiaries, consent is operative only against those who have in
fact assented. In Dodge's Estate2 2 the life beneficiary approved an
improper investment but remaindermen did not. A loss resulted.
The trustee was forced to replace the value of the investment in
the trust estate for the benefit of the remaindermen but any income
arising therefrom belonged tp the trustee rather than to the life
beneficiary who had approved the investment. This is not so, how-
ever, if the consenting beneficiary and the non-consenting bene-
113 Boon v. Hall, 76 App. Div. 520, 78 N.Y. Supp. 557 (1902); Carrigan v.
Drake, 36 S.C. 354, 15 S.E. 339 (1892); Butler v. Gazzam, 81 Ala. 491, 1 So. 16
(1886); In 7e Wilenburg's Estate, 177 Misc. 49, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 896 (1941).
114 Ellig v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 683 (1858).
1 1S Day v. First Trust and Savings Bank of Pasadena, 47 Cal. App. 2d 470,
118 P. 2d 51 (1941); In re Walton's Estate, 348 Pa. 143, 34 A. 2d 484 (1943);
Summers v. Summers, 339 Pa. 170, 14 A. 2d 120 (1940); 19 MmNN. L. REv. 348
(1935); ScoTT, TausTs § 216 p. 1151 (1939); BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TausTEEs § 942
(1946).11 6 1linot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 17 N.E. 839 (1888); Hoyt v. Latham, 143
U.S. 553, 570, 12 Sup. Ct 568 (1892).
117 Pennsylvania Co. Etc. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 59 A. 2d 24 (1948).
1 18 Naselli v. Mullholland, 89 F. Supp. 943 (D.C.D.C 1950); Schurman v.
Pegau, 136 Neb. 628, 286 N.W. 921 (1939); Winn v. Shugart, 112 F. 2d 617 (10th
Cir. 1940); REsTATmum , TRUSTS § 219 (1935); 63 HAv. L. REv. 1214 (1950).
119 In re Clabby's Estate, 338 Pa. 305, 12 A. 2d 71 (1940); In re Schlicht's
Estate, 231 Wis. 324, 285 N.W. 730 (1939); Herpolsheimer v. Michigan Trust
Co., 261 Mich. 209, 246 N.W. 81 (1933). But see Paul v. Girard Trust Co., 124
F. 2d 809 (7th Cir. 1941); People by Kerner v. Canton National Bank of Canton,
288 IMI. App. 418, 6 N.E. 2d 220 (1937).
120 Willis v. Holcomb, 83 Ohio St. 254, 94 N.E. 436 (1911); In re Goldman's
Estate, 142 Misc. 790, 255 N.Y. Supp. 533 (1932).
121 Crews v. Willis, 195 Okla. 475, 159 P. 2d 251 (1945).
12239 N.Y.S. 2d 186 (1943), affd, 266 App. Div. 845, 43 N.Y.S. 2d 512 (1943),
leave to appeal denied, 291 N.Y. 828, 52 N.E. 2d 119 (1944).
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ficiary are in privity,123 or if the non-consenting beneficiary in any
Way derives title from the consenting beneficiary. 124 An unusual
application of this principle occurred in City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. Cannon.25 The settlor created a trust naming herself life
beneficiary and reserving powers to revoke and amend, with re-
mainder over to her five named children. She consented to the
improper retention of certain shares of stock. A loss occurred.
The court held that the settlor's consent precluded the children
from complaining since the reservation of the powers made her in
substance the owner of the property.
In the consent situation, then, the courts, "while not departing
from the fundamental rule of strict responsibility, excuse a trustee
from the consequences of an act done fairly and in good faith if it
has been done with the consent of the beneficiary, who was sui juris,
fully acquainted with the relevant facts and his legal rights, and was
-Aot improperly influenced by the trustee.' 2 6
WiiERE THE BREACHING TRUSTEE SEs To
BALANcE Loss AGAINST GAIN
"If A holds a dog and a cat on trust for B, and in breach of
trust loses the cat, it will be no answer to B's claim to produce the
dog and a litter of puppies. 2 7 This quaintly illustrates the well
settled doctrine that a fiduciary cannot balance losses against gains:
if he has incurred a loss through a breach of trust he cannot satisfy
or reduce his liability by a gain from another breach of trust nor by
i gain from another transaction which is not a breach. 23 Thus, if
the trustee breaches his duty with respect to one investment he
must stand the surcharge for a resulting loss even though the estate
has profited from other investments, proper or improper.
The basic reason for this harsh result seems to be one of deter-
rence, i.e., to remove the temptation from trustees in general to
breach their trusts by emphasizing the fact that it will be a losing
123 In re Bunker's Estate, 183 Misc. 523, 49 N.Y.S. 2d 619 (1944).
124 In re Perkin's Trust Estate, 314 Pa. 49, 170 AUt. 255 (1934). But com-
pare In re Post's Estate, 56 Ohio L. Abs. 240, 91 N.E. 2d 698 (1949).
125 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E. 2d 674 (1943), reargument denied 293 N.Y. 358,
59 N.E. 2d 445 (1944). See Scott, The Effects of a Power to Revoke a Trust,
57 HARv. L. REv. 362 (1944).
126 Judge Soper in the case of Goldman v. Kaplan, 170 F. 2d 503, 506 (4th
Cir. 1948).
127 1 Rls JuDIcATAE 106 (1940), citing HAxauay, MoDmE EQU=TY 314 (1946).
12REsTATEmE-T, TausTs § 213 (1935), especially comments a and b
BOGERT, TUSTS AmD TausTEs § 702 (1946); ScoTT, TRusTs § 213 (1939); Penn-
sylvania Co. Etc. v. Gillmore, 142 N. J. Eq. 27, 59 A. 2d 24, 36 (1948); State v.
Bartling, 149 Neb. 491, 31 N.W. 2d 422, 428 (1948); Schuster v. North American
Mortgage Loan Co., 44 Ohio L. Abs. 577, 65 N.E. 2d 667 (1942); Note, 171 A.L.R.
1422 (1947).
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proposition. 29 In this respect, it has a kinship with the loyalty rule
where "uncompromising rigidity"'3 0 has been the pattern. Indeed,
it has frequently been explained as another application of the loyalty
principle. It is said that the trustee must act properly with respect
to each investment; so the gain in each case belongs to the trust
estate and the trustee cannot be permitted to reap a personal ad-
vantage by using it to offset his liability for loss.'
3
'
The rule has not, however, been free from attack. It has been
stoutly contended that the trustee should be permitted to balance
losses against gains made from separate but substantially contem-
poraneous improper investments, regardless of the intent of the
trustee; that if the improper investments are separated by intervals
of time the general rule should be applied only where deterrence
would protect the estate from risk, as where the trustee wilfully
misappropriates trust property, hazards it for his own benefit or
knowingly breaches his trust; and that it should not be applied when
it would not forestall the risk, as where the trustee acts honestly
and in ignorance of any wrongdoing. 32 The chief weakness of this
rather appealing thesis is found in the fact that it would place a
trustee in a better position if his first investment is in breach of
trust than if it is not, for obviously a trustee is not allowed to use
a loss from breach to reduce a gain made from an authorized act.
133
The severity of the general rule that a trustee cannot ordinarily
balance losses against gains is tempered by the limitation that he
may do so if the profit and loss occur as part of the same general
transaction. "Where there is only one transaction equity simply
watches through all its vicissitudes and adjusts accounts according
to the final result."'134 Or, in the words of the Restatement, "if the
breaches of trust are not distinct, the trustee is accountable only
for the net gain or chargeable with the net loss. .... ,,135
What will constitute one general transaction? When are the
breaches of the trustee "not distinct"? Each case must, of course,
stand on its own facts136 but a number of fact situations which have
129 See Scors, TRusTs § 213.1 p. 1137 (1939).
130 Cardozo's classic statement will be recalled. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249,
N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545 (1929).
131 Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N.E. 761 (1931); BOGERT, TRUSTS
AND TrUsTErs § 702 (1946).
132 Harris, Liability of a Trustee: Balancing Gains Against Losses, 23 Ky.
L. J. 338 (1935).
133 See Scozr, Teusss § 213.1 p. 1138 (1939). But see Harris's statistical
answer, 23 Ky. L J. 351, (1935).
134 1 RES JuDicATAE 106 (1940), citing HANBuRY, MoDERN EQuTY 320 (1946).
135 RESTATEMENT, TRusTS § 213 (1935). See 36 COL. L. RPv. 1015, 1016 (1936)
136 See RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 213 comment e (1935) for a list of seven
factors which may be of importance in determining whether the breaches are
distinct.
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been judicially approved are included in the Comments to the
Restatement. There is but one transaction (1) where a single prop-
erty has been bought for a lump sum and sold in parts, some at a
profit and some at a loss; 13 7 (2) where the improper investment is
in stock and the trustee receives stock dividends or rights which are
sold;138 (3) where the trustee buys securities to protect securities
improperly retained; 139 (4) where the trustee wrongfully pledges
trust property with a broker to secure a margin account which he
uses for speculation with varying success, 14° (5) where the trustee
breaches by carrying on the business of the testator, first making
profits and then losses;141 and (6) where an improper investment
or reinvestment passes through a number of stages, some of which
are profitable and others are not. 42
Although governed by similar considerations, the "same gen-
eral transaction" problem is somewhat more difficult when the
breaches by the trustee do not involve purchase or manipulation of
investments but only improper retention. In McInnes v. Goldth-
waite,14 an executor appointed in 1931 was under the duty of pay-
ing minor bequests and turning over the bulk of the estate to trus-
tees for charity. All of the properties were readily marketable.
Among them were fifteen securities which were non-legals. He de-
layed selling or transferring the property to the residuary trust for
some twelve years. His excuse was his erroneous impression that
he was privileged to wait for a demand by the residuary trustees.
As of the date of disposition, compared with the value one year after
the executor's appointment, when presumably he should have sold,
two of the securities showed a loss. The remaining thirteen showed
such a large profit that the value of all fifteen had approximately
doubled. The New Hampshire court held that it was improper to
surcharge the executor with the loss on the two securities. It found
that he had acted in good faith and said that there was but one
breach of trust with respect to all fifteen securities. He was ac-
countable only for the net gain because he had "followed a settled
and consistent policy concerning the securities left by the deceased,
137 See MacBryde v. Burnett, 132 F. 2d 898, 901 (4th Cir. 1942); RESTATE-
meET, TRUSTS § 213, comment j (1935).
138 Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N.E. 761, 765 (1931); BESTATEL ET,
TRUSTS § 213, comment g (1935).
139 Lacey v. Davis, 5 Redfield Surr. 301 (N.Y. 1882); RESTATEumT, TRUSTS
§ 213, comment h (1935).
140 English v. McIntire, 29 App. Div. 439, 51 N.Y. Supp. 697 (1898); RE-
STATEmENT, TRUSTS § 213, comment i (1935).
141 Hleathcote v. Hulme, 1 Jac. & Walker 122 (1819); RESTATEmmT, TRusTs
§ 213, comment j (1935).
142 Baker v. Disbrow, 18 Hun. 29 (1879), aff'd. 79 N.Y. 631 (1880); RESTATE-
MT, TRusTS § 213, comments kc and 1 (1935).
143 94 N.H. 331, 52 A. 2d 795 (1947).
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which as a whole resulted advantageously... Whatever the plain-
tiff's reason for delaying his accounting, his one policy of holding
the securities during the economic depression of the thirties not only
resulted in practically doubling their worth from the time of one
year after his appointment but yielded a very substantial profit
over the inventory values."
A court could hardly fail to take note of the apparent greed of
beneficiaries who seek more than the net gain on facts like these.1 44
Nevertheless, if the McInnes case is considered apart from its de-
pression setting, it is difficult to sustain it on principle. While the
pursuance of a "single policy" by the breaching trustee is admittedly
a factor which may be weighed in deciding whether his acts were
part of one transaction or not,145 it is doubtful whether inaction alone
constitutes such a policy. Even assuming it does, mere delay with
respect to different securities does not seem to be a thread substan-
tial enough to tie the conduct of the trustee into one general trans-
action. A consistent habit of breaching one's trust will not do.
Uniform procrastination affecting a number of independent invest-
ments can scarcely stand in a better light.
In Buck's Wifl 1 4 6 an executor received from himself as commit-
tee of the property of the testatrix a number of different securities,
including several non-legals. He ultimately converted all of the
securities, realizing a substantial net profit. The court found, how-
ever, that he had delayed unreasonably in converting a railroad
bond and some utility and automotive stocks. It surcharged him
with the losses caused by the retention of these securities and re-
fused to permit him to reduce the losses by gains made through the
retention, proper or improper, of the other securities. The court
said, "A trustee who is liable for a loss resulting from a breach of
trust with respect to one portion of the trust property cannot reduce
his liability by reason of a gain with respect to another,portion of
the trust property occasioned by a separate and distinct breach of
trust. The retention of trust property, some of which has been sold
at a loss, and the balance of which has been disposed of at a profit,
is within the application of this rule."
The New York court did not consider whether the fiduciary
pursued a "single policy" of delay. He had simply held the various
144 Since the McInness case involved a charitable trust, the accounting
was sought by an Attorney General and others. See In re Porter's Estate, 5
Misc. 274, 25 N.Y. Supp. 822 (1893) where a fiduciary delayed selling various
speculative securities because of high income returns. The court said it did
not accord with its "notions of equity" to allow the beneficiaries more than
the net gain.
145 See RESTATEmES, TRusTs § 213, comment e (1935).
146 55 N.Y.S. 2d 841 (N.Y. Surr. 1945).
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securities beyond a reasonable time. If that alone constitutes a
"policy," he had one.
The Restatement at first appears to support a view at variance
with the Mclnnes decision. It says: "If the trustee originally re-
ceives as a part of the trust estate several securities which are not
proper trust investments and which he is under a duty to sell, and
he sells none of them, and some of them appreciate in value and
others depreciate, the beneficiary is entitled to the profit accruing
on those which appreciate and can hold the trustee liable for a loss
on those which depreciate."' 47
However, subsequently a caveat is inserted: "No opinion is ex-
pressed on the question whether the trustee can offset profits
against losses when in pursuance of a single policy he has improper-
ly delayed selling securities of the same character received by him
as a part of the trust estate, and subsequently sells some at a profit
and others at a loss; as for instance where he receives shares of a
particular corporation or shares of stock of similar corporations
which it is his duty to sell within a year and which he sells after
the expiration of a year, some at a profit and others at a loss."' 49
It will be noted that the caveat does not state that delay without
more constitutes a "single policy." Indeed, the two quotations when
read together infer quite the opposite. Further, it is possible that
the doubt expressed in the caveat is confined to a situation where
the securities are similar in nature, e.g., utilities or railroads or auto-
motives, and does not apply to a mixed portfolio.
At any rate, it is the view of the writers that the McInnes case
is supportable only when considered in its depression setting. It is
another instance where a court has been reluctant to surcharge a
fiduciary who acted in good faith and, on the whole, did a creditable
job during a period of great economic stress.
147 Comment a, p. 594 (1935).
148 p. 599.
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